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 IS TIMELINESS NEXT TO GODLINESS?   
THE STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS OF TARDY ENTRY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Timeliness can mean everything.  Arrive 15 minutes late for a job interview and you are likely to 
walk away still unemployed.  Complete a task after the deadline and you may be looking for a new 
job.  Yet, despite its importance, timeliness in a business context — whether, for example, a firm 
delivers a new product in a timely or tardy manner — has been little studied by management scholars.  
In this article, we begin to address the need for such research by developing and testing a model of 
how strategic considerations might influence a firm’s propensity to miss market entry schedules.  We 
then explore the degree to which such tardy entry influences future sales performance. 
 
The actual timing of entry into new markets has been the subject of extensive research.  Many 
scholars have sought to explore when and where earlier or later entrants are more likely to gain a 
competitive advantage (Kerin et al. 1992).  They have begun to reveal when entry timing or order 
influences future success. What they have not done is consider whether the actual time of entry was 
different from that originally scheduled or announced;
1
 that is, whether the firm’s observed entry was 
tardy or timely.  Yet, there is reason to believe that timeliness as well as the actual timing of entry 
influences a firm’s prospects (Hendricks and Singhal 1997).  Timeliness or tardiness may reflect on a 
firm’s propensity for honesty.  It may also reveal information about a firm’s operational abilities. 
 
                                                 
1
 For the sake of consistency, we refer to the first announcement date of the product as the ―scheduled‖ entry 
date.  If the firm actually ships the product on that date, the firm’s entry is ―timely.‖  If the firm is delayed 
shipping the product relative to the announcement date (see below in the Methods section), we denote that 
―tardy entry.‖ 
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Research on the timeliness of market entry could have considerable practical importance. Delivery of 
products significantly after originally scheduled release dates, what we will call tardy entry, has been 
observed in several industries.  For example, in a study of software projects, Bayus, Jain, and Rao 
(1997), found that fully 47% of the projects were delayed by at least 3 months (Bayus et al. 1997).  In 
the software industry, such delays have even gained a derogatory moniker: ―vaporware.‖  What may 
cause such tardiness?  Is it that firms act strategically in setting schedules?  Or, is it that they simply 
run into unexpected technological problems that require extensions in production times?  In this 
article, we will emphasize analysis of some possible strategic explanations for why firms might be 
more or less likely to miss market entry schedules. 
 
We will also consider some potential operational causes of tardy entry.  We will consider how the 
propensity to be tardy in releasing products to new markets is influenced by a firm’s technological 
experience, product attributes, and existing technological position.  Each of these elements deserves 
dedicated theoretical and empirical analysis, and could themselves be the subject of focused research.  
In this article, however, we include these factors only as ―controls.‖  We hope to return to the 
operational determinants of tardy entry in later investigations. 
 
One explanation for why tardy entry has been neglected in past research is that analysis of tardy entry 
entails significant data and methodological challenges (Wu et al. 2004).  Most prosaically, such 
research requires scholars to measure both scheduled and actual entry, and this can be a considerable 
challenge when using archival data.  More importantly, it requires the creation of econometric models 
for both entry schedules and tardiness.  Finally, it requires consideration of endogenous choice among 
the models.   
 
In this article, we use detailed information about scheduled and actual entry into the hard disk 
industry.  Over 20 years, the Disk / Trend Report gathered information on every firm that planned or 
actually produced new disk drives.  When these new disk drives were targeted toward a new ―format 
size‖, they represent entry into a new product market (Christensen 1997).  We develop a model of 
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how firm and market attributes influenced a firm’s scheduled time for releasing a product with these 
new format sizes.  We then also develop a model for when firms tended to be tardy in meeting these 
schedules.  Finally, we analyze whether tardy entry influences a firm’s chances of success in the new 
market. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The nascent literature on tardy entry draws on both the entry timing and the ―preannouncement‖ 
literatures.  Entry timing, whether tardy or timely, has been the subject of considerable scholarly 
research.  In general, results seem to suggest that early entry provides advantages, but that numerous 
tradeoffs, contingencies, and exceptions exist (Kerin et al. 1992; Lieberman and Montgomery 1998).  
Early entry is most valuable when markets exhibit increasing returns to scale (e.g., network 
externalities or economies of scale:Katz and Shapiro 1985; Klepper 1996).  Moreover, the effect of 
early entry may differ across firm types.  Incumbent firms with considerable complementary assets 
may be able to enter later in the development of a new market, and so avoid the inevitable mistakes 
that harm market pioneers (Christensen et al. 1998).  Later entry may allow firms to avoid mistakes 
made by earlier entrants, and it may allow more efficient use of development resources (Lieberman 
and Montgomery 1998).  Early entry may truncate the development of product features and force the 
firm to encapsulate less complete or polished technology in their product. 
 
The ―preannouncement‖ literature considers the benefits and costs of advanced announcement of a 
scheduled entry time (Robertson et al. 1995).  In a fundamental paper, Farrell and Saloner (1986) 
argue that managers may use early scheduled entry to forestall competition or discourage customers 
from buying rival products (Farrell and Saloner 1986).  Preannouncements, they argue, may signal an 
intention to aggressively compete with rivals and so prevent their entry.  It may also create 
uncertainty about eventual winners of network externalities, and thereby cause customers to wait for a 
clearer indication about the emerging winner (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989).   
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Of course, scheduling an entry date is also fraught with considerable risk.  Eliashberg and Robertson 
(1988) argue that large firms may not (pre-)announce entry schedules or may provide more accurate 
announcements because of anti-trust concerns or because they fear cannibalization of existing 
products (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988).  The threat of lost reputation may also prevent firms from 
announcing product delivery schedules.  For example, delays in Microsoft’s new operating system 
have harmed their reputation for reliability and technological excellence (Cooper 2006).  Finally, 
uncertainty about technical aspects of new product development may make managers wary of 
announcing entry schedules. 
 
A theory of tardy entry 
Developing a strategic theory for tardiness requires considering both the benefits and costs of missing 
a scheduled entry.  This in turn could be a function of the incentives to post a more aggressive entry 
schedule, the cost of meeting this schedule, and the penalty for being late.  The emerging literature on 
tardy entry emphasizes first order effects (cf. Wu et al. 2004).  For example, the propensity to 
schedule an earlier entry is thought to also increase the propensity to miss that schedule, and likewise, 
an increase in the cost of tardiness is thought to reduce its likelihood.  A more accurate, but also much 
more complicated analysis would include the multiple reaction functions of managers, customers, 
competitors, and complementors in calculating a new equilibrium outcome.  We wish eventually to 
perform such an analysis, but first we must begin to develop a basic understanding of tardiness.  To 
do this, we will follow the existing literature in forming hypotheses based on a first-order analysis 
(fig. 1).  We will, however, consider more complex reactions in our empirical analysis, and we will 
discuss the implication of our findings for future research. 
 
****insert figure 1 about here*** 
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Tardiness as a function of entry schedule 
Forestalling of Competitors.  One of the principal articles of the initial literature on the predictors of 
tardy entry suggests that the incentive to forestall competition can explain tardy entry.  Strategic 
models of forestalling entry generally argue that firms can prevent the entry of competitors by 
demonstrating that such entry will not be profitable (Milgrom and Roberts 1982).  Firms can do this 
by demonstrating that should another firm attempt to enter the market, they will aggressively compete 
with them (Dixit 1980).  For this reason, firms may invest in large production facilities that 
demonstrate that they plan to have the capacity to serve the majority of the market.  They may also 
announce their plans to deliver a product at an early date.  In so doing, they attempt to demonstrate 
the degree to which they are investing in long term returns from the market and so dissuade 
competitors from entering. 
 
Firms may also wish to signal their strategic intent to customers and complementors by scheduling an 
early entry date (Robertson et al. 1995).  When markets exhibit increasing returns, early entrants can 
gain an insurmountable competitive advantage.  Once they recognize an emerging winner, customers 
and complementors often pile on and reinforce the increasing returns.  If competitors can slow the 
development of these returns, they may be able to slow this process and gain a foothold.  As 
demonstrated by Farrell and Saloner (1986), one way to do this is for the firm to schedule an early 
entry.  By announcing an early date, firms may be trying to signal competitors that they will fight 
aggressively for market control.  They may also be trying to sow confusion among customers about 
which firm will eventually dominate the market, and thereby dissuade customers and complementors 
from purchasing or specifying competing products.   
 
H1: Firms with a larger share of existing markets will be more likely to set early entry schedules, and 
thus be more likely to be tardy in meeting these schedules. 
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Tardiness and cannibalization. Managers in technical industries often fear that new products will 
cannibalize existing ones.  In a survey of managers from a wide range of industries, Eliashberg & 
Robertson (1988) report that the fear of cannibalization was an important factor of managerial 
decisions in deciding whether and when to schedule a product release.  The main effect of this fear 
should be to reduce the tendency to schedule early release dates for new products, because this may 
cause customers to stop buying older models and instead wait for newer ones.  Firms that risk 
cannibalization of existing products should wish to keep as short a window between the 
announcement of a new product and its delivery.  This means that announced schedules will be more 
certain (because they will be more imminent in time), and that firms will be more exacting in 
delivering on schedule. 
 
The risk of cannibalization increases for firms with greater sales in existing markets, because these 
firms stand to lose a greater number of current customers.  Thus, we hypothesize that these firms will 
be less likely to miss product release schedules. 
 
H2: Firms with a larger share of existing markets will be likely to set later entry schedules, and thus 
be less likely to be tardy in meeting these schedules. 
 
It is important to note, that both elements of H2 directly contradict H1.  Yet, the theoretical logic of 
the two hypotheses is not exclusive.  Thus, confirmation of one hypothesis will not necessarily refute 
the logic of the other.  Such a result could just reflect the size of influence of the two effects relative 
to each other. 
 
Tardiness as a function of sanction costs 
Reputation costs from tardy entry.  Tardy entry is likely to be more damaging for some firms than for 
others.  Clearly, part of this financial penalty is caused simply by lost sales of the delayed product.  In 
other cases, it represents harm to a firm’s reputation for honesty and accuracy.  
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Firms often depend on their reputation to serve as evidence of the credibility of otherwise untestable 
performance claims (Kirmani and Rao 2000).  For many technical products, performance cannot be 
verified through observation or specified in contracts (Kirmani and Rao 2000). Instead, exchange 
partners must rely on reputation or ―relational assets‖ to act as guarantors of such unobservable claims 
(Baker et al. 2002).  If after purchase, buyers determine that performance or quality claims have been 
false, they can refuse to purchase other products produced by the firm.  Such sanctions can occur for 
future products or for other related products whose purchase the customer may forgo.  The threat of 
these lost sales, evocatively called ―the shadow of the future‖, prevents firms from making false 
claims now.  This shadow is more threatening when the firm would lose more future sales.   
 
H3a: Firms will be less likely to miss entry schedules if they produce other products in the same 
technical market. 
 
Sanctions also exist across product types.  Firms invest in a reputation for honesty and truthfulness 
(Kirmani and Rao 2000).  This investment serves as a forfeitable bond that provides evidence of the 
truthfulness of unobserveable claims (Kirmani and Rao 2000).  Should the firm renege on some 
promise, it reflects on all of the firms promises.  Empirical evidence demonstrates that lost reputation 
in one domain often spills over to other markets (Mitchell 1989).  Thus, we reason that firms will be 
less likely to miss product schedules if they also produce products in other markets. 
 
H3b: Firms will be less likely to miss entry schedules if they produce products in other markets. 
 
Prevailing norms 
Theory suggests that the degree to which a firm is sanctioned for tardy entry will also depend on 
prevailing norms of behavior.  In many cases, norms do not arise from an outside authority, but are 
instead the outcome of tradition and custom (Ingram and Silverman 2002).  If the large majority of 
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firms enter promptly at their scheduled time, then tardiness will be more severely sanctioned.  Norms 
and sanctions can change dramatically over time (Ostrom 2000).  For example, norms in advertising 
kept certain types of commercials off the air.  These norms have gradually broken down as more 
aggregators and cable operators have begun to air ads once thought to be too risquée. We surmise that 
a similar process could also occur in truth telling about product schedules.   
 
H4: The more common the occurrence of tardy entry in past market entry, the more likely firms 
will be tardy when entering future markets.  
 
 
   
RESEARCH METHOD 
The disk drive industry provides an excellent opportunity to explore the determinants and 
consequences of tardiness in releasing products for new markets.  From the late 70s to the late 90s, the 
industry underwent several major technological and market transitions.  More than six new format 
sizes (the diameter of the spinning disk) were introduced — each considerably smaller than the 
previous one, and each serving a different type of customer at the beginning. For example, the 14-inch 
disk drive could initially be found in mainframe computers, the 8-inch in mini-computers, the 5.25-
inch in workstations, the 3.5-inch in personal computers, the 2.5-inch drives in laptops, and smaller 
drives in MP3 players, watches, cell phones, and so on.   
 
Data and Sample 
Data on the disk drive industry were obtained from the Disk/Trend Report (D/TR), a reliable source of 
information for the industry.  The report was compiled annually under the supervision of one person 
— James Porter — from 1976 to 1999.  We used information on years from 1976 to 1995.  To 
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compile information on shipment schedules, we augmented and verified information from the D/TR 
with information from Lexis-Nexis. 
 
The D/TR contains information on 208 firms that ever produced a disk drive. We constructed a cross-
section data of firms announcing their market entry in a new format size (14, 8, 5.25, 3.5, 2.5 and 1.8-
inch) between 1976 and 1995.  We collected 235 observations.  To calculate the independent 
variables used in our analysis, we needed to analyze the entry schedule and tardiness of firms that 
already produced a disk drive.  Therefore, we excluded those firms that announced and shipped in one 
format size only, focusing our attention on firms that entered more than one market niche (n=117). 
Moreover, we also excluded firms that announced a new format size but never shipped one. We 
performed robustness checks by including them as illustrated in Appendix 1, but we did not find 
statistical differences that changed our ability to confirm (or fail to confirm) our hypotheses.  The 
total sample consists of 109 observed market entries across 64 firms in 6 format sizes.  The 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix can be found in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
*** Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here *** 
 
Dependent Variables 
To conduct our analysis, we must analyze models of the scheduled entry date and the propensity of 
the firm to be tardy in meeting this date.  To understand the import of both scheduled and actual entry 
times, we analyze their effect on the firm’s performance.  Thus, we use three dependent variables in 
our study. 
 
Scheduled Release Date captures the focal firm’s announced entry schedule in comparison with other 
firm’s scheduled entry for that particular format size (i.e. a new market).  The variable is calculated as 
the scheduled date minus the average scheduled release date for that format size divided by the 
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standard deviation. Thus, it represents the deviation of the firm’s scheduled release date from other 
firms.  Information on scheduled release came from the D/T Report
2
 and Lexis/Nexis searches.   
 
Tardy Entry captures whether there is at least a 1-month time lag between the announced release date 
and the actual ship date for a firm entering a new format size.  The variable tardy entry takes the value 
of one when there is a delay between the scheduled and the actual shipment date and takes value of 
zero otherwise
3
.  The length of delay is obtained by the Disk/Trend Report and by Lexis/Nexis articles 
on new format categories.
4
  
 
For example, Syquest Technology was started in 1982 to manufacture disk drives for the personal 
computer market. The first shipment of fixed and removable disk drives was scheduled for mid-1982, 
with very large quantities planned for 1983 (Computerworld 1982; Porter 1982-1985). Technical 
problems with the drive compromised the plan and forced the firm to postpone the shipment until the 
end of 1983. During 1984, however, the firm was able to reach high volume production and a reliable 
drive. In this case, we code the scheduled entry date as July, 1982 and the actual release date as 
November, 1983. 
 
We cross-checked information from the Disk Trend Report with Lexis/Nexis articles to obtain clear 
and reliable information.  The average entry delay in whole sample (including the firms that were on 
time) is 3.5 months. The average entry delay increases to 10 months for only those firms that were 
tardy.  
                                                 
2
 Some of the product shipment dates are prior to the publication of D/T Report, others later. Therefore, one 
could consider the ones after the publication date as pre-announcements and the ones before the publication date 
as an indication of an effective shipment.  However, the picture is more complicated than it seems. We checked 
each of the shipment dates in the following reports and in some cases in Lexis Nexis files, and we could not find 
such a systematic pattern. Many shipment dates reported before the report publication date were actually pre-
announcements, because the actual shipment date was postponed. We could not find a trend of being late for the 
product being announced before the report was published in comparison with the ones announced later. 
3
 To test the robustness of our analysis to other parameterizations of entry, we also estimate a model of the 
duration of entry delay.  Results for this specification are found in Appendix 1. 
4
 The Disk/Trend Report specifies the shipment date down to the month or occasionally quarter. When specified 
quarterly, we express the date as the second month of the quarter. For example, a scheduled entry date in the 2Q 
of 1985 is coded as April, 1985. 
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The Average future sales variable captures the firm’s eventual success in the market category (disk 
diameter or format size).  It is calculated as the log of the average future sales of each firm in each 
market divided by the number of years in which the firm produced a drive in that market. 
Independent Variables  
Market share. Our hypotheses 1 and 2 propose that firms with a larger share of existing markets will 
be more likely to try to forestall competition (1) or fear cannibalization (2).  We operationalize ―share 
of existing markets‖ as a continuous variable that captures the market share of the focal firm of all 
sales of the prior disk drive format size. This measure is heavily skewed to the left (most firms have 
only a small share).  To test the robustness of our findings to other operationalizations of the variable, 
we also measured it as binary variable that capture the market share of the focal firm in the prior 
market or format size.  This binary specification takes a value of 1 when market share is higher than 
5% (share_binary).  
 
Product market exposure.  Our second set of independent variables measure the potential 
disadvantages of tardy entry.  We hypothesize that the more the firm sells products in numerous 
product markets, the more it will fear the reputational cost of tardy entry. We measure product market 
exposure with two binary variables: de alio and entry niches. 
 
De alio identifies the nature of firm entrants.  De alio producers are firms that diversify from other 
related markets.  Those firms must maintain their reputation among customers in different markets, 
and the managers of these firms may fear that customers may interpret tardy entry as evidence of poor 
quality or technological expertise.   
 
To measure the second aspect of product market exposure, entry niches, we simply count the number 
of format and size categories for which a firm produces a given disk drive in a given year.  Inspection 
of the variable reveals that it is dramatically skewed to the left – most firms produce only a few 
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drives, and a few produce a great number.  To mitigate the potential for outliers to bias our results, we 
decided to use a binary measure in our analysis.  This measure takes on a value of 0 if the firm 
produces fewer than the median value (6 drives) and 1 if the firm produces 6 or more drives. This 
variable captures the diversification of firms within the same industry.   
 
Prior lateness. Hypothesis 4 is based on theories that predict that norms concerning entry tardiness 
will influence future propensities to enter in a timely manner.  We hypothesize that such norms will 
be influenced by observed behavior in previous market entry.  We measure prior lateness as the 
percentage of firms that postponed their scheduled shipment in the previous market.  For example, we 
use the percentage of firms that were tardy in entering the 8 inch format size to predict the propensity 
to be tardy in entering the 5.25 inch format size. 
 
Control Variables  
We also include in our econometric models variables that capture various facets of firm experience in 
product design, production, and sales.  We also measure the firm’s position relative to the existing 
technological frontier, and its reported technological ambition.  We use these and other measures as 
control variables. 
 
Design experience. Firm may miss entry schedules because they lack the experience to foresee the 
operational difficulties that may arise in new development efforts.  We capture the degree to which a 
firm has had experience developing new products by counting the number of new designs that they 
have previously produced.  We follow (Baum and Ingram 1998) in discounting these design 
occurrences by dividing by the time that has elapsed since the design.  We then sum these discounted 
values.  Finally, we create a deviation score for each firm in each year. The result is a measure of the 
degree to which the firm has recent design experience (as compared to other firms in that year). 
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Production and sales experience.  We follow King and Tucci (2002) in creating our measure of the 
firm’s production and sales experience.  This measure represents the deviation in the sum of 
discounted sales for each firm in each year.  It represents the degree to which any firm in a given year 
has recently produced a greater or smaller number of disk drives. 
 
Technological Position.  Firms attempting to create new products at the technological frontier are 
more likely to incur development problems and consequently they might need to reschedule the new 
product introduction time (Schoonhoven et al. 1990).  We calculated the technological position of the 
focal firm related to other firms in the previous market following the Agarwal et al. (2004) method 
(technological position).   
 
Technological Ambition. We also add a variable that captures the difference between the current and 
the previous technological position (jump). The bigger the difference in technological position, the 
greater the technological ―jump‖ from the previous to the current format size.  
 
We also measure managerial experience in the industry as a binary variable (experienced founders) as 
found by doing a content analysis of the initial report on the firm in the D/TR; and how long the firm 
has been in the industry as normalized deviation of time length (age). Finally, we control for firm 
nationality (US) and market (dummy variable for each format size). 
 
Statistical method and models 
We use three different statistical methods to test our hypotheses. We use a GLS regression to model 
the determinants of the scheduled entry date.  Then we use a probit regression to examine tardy entry.  
Finally, to evaluate how early entry schedule and tardy entry affect performance, we use a 3-stage 
least squares model. The models and their dependent variables are illustrated below.  
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Scheduled Entry model.   We use a generalized least square regression model to predict early entry 
schedule and test the first part of H1 and H2: 
 
  yij =   +  X ij + ij 
 
where y is a measure of the scheduled release date of the firm i in a new format category j.  The 
vector X ij represents the characteristics of the firm i or of its industry in the year before its entry into 
format j.  Firm characteristics from the previous format size and in the previous year are likely to 
influence the scheduled release date in the new market. For example, the characteristics of a firm or 
its industry producing 8-in drives last year will influence the scheduled entry announcement in the 
5.25-in market this year.  
 
Since firms may enter more than one market or format category, our observations are not independent 
within groups (firms).  We use White’s robust specification to account for the correlation of the error 
terms within groups.  This method calculates the standard errors for coefficient estimations by 
considering errors to be grouped by firm, and then calculates the group’s contribution to variance 
estimates.  Unlike other methods of grouping observations (e.g. fixed and random effects), this 
method does not allow each group to have a constrained or unconstrained intercept.   
 
Tardy Entry model.  To test the second part of H1 and H2 and the other hypotheses, we also model a 
firm’s propensity to be tardy.  Following previous research, we use a limited dependent variable to 
measure whether a firm has been tardy, and thus we employ a probit model to measure the 
determinants of tardiness. 
 
  Pij (=1|z) = Φ (Zij )  
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Where Pi is the probability of the firm i to postpone the scheduled release date , in which  is the 
coefficient estimate for the probit model. The vector Z contains characteristics of the firm i before its 
entry into format j (such as technological position, market share, design experience, entry niches and 
de alio), characteristics of the firm i in the current format j (like scheduled entry and jump,) and 
industry characteristics in the year before its entry (prior lateness).   
 
One of the elements of vector Z is the scheduled entry date, and this variable is itself the outcome of 
an endogenous choice process.  To understand the role of such endogeneity, we use two different 
models. In one, we use an instrumental variable approach to attempt to eliminate the effect of factors 
that might simultaneously influence the choice of entry schedule and the propensity to be tardy.  In 
the other, we test for the robustness of our findings by using the actual measurement of announcement 
schedule.  The reason to have two models is given by the recent discussion among scholars on 
whether early or late market timing is an endogenous variable like other examples of strategic 
managerial choice (Boulding and Christen 2003).  Managers make strategic decisions based on 
expectations of how their choices (whether to make or buy, to enter later or earlier) influence future 
performance. Therefore, some scholars argue, managers’ decisions are endogenous to their expected 
outcomes
5
 (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003).  Until recently, the endogeneity problem was overlooked 
and, when addressed, its significance was often minimized (Shaver 1998).  To guard against mistaken 
inference caused by such endogeneity, we first identified some instrumental variables that predicted 
market entry schedule, but did not predict tardiness.  We then specified models using the predicted 
schedule.  We present and discuss the results of models using both the actual scheduled and IV 
predicted schedule..  
 
Performance model.  Finally, we wish to understand whether tardiness influences the future success 
of the firm.  Once again, we have endogenous variables.  Both the firm’s entry schedule and its 
tardiness may be a function of factors that also (and directly) influence performance.  To help reduce 
problems associated with such endogeneity, we use a 3SLS as: 
                                                 
5
 If not, we may conclude that managerial decisions are randomly made.  
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ij =  + yij + ij + i 
 
where ij is a measure of the future sales of the firm i in that market sector j, yij  is the scheduled 
release date for firm i in sector j.  We use an OLS model to predict this scheduled entry (as above) 
 
yij =   + ’X ij-1 + ij-1 
 
and we use a probit mode (as above) to predict the propensity to be tardy where ij  is the tardy entry 
function 
 
Pij (=1|z) = Φ (Zij )  
 
The 3SLS estimates systems of structural equations, where some of these equations include 
endogenous variables among exogenous ones. These endogenous variables (in our case, yij and ij ) 
are the dependent variables of other equations. The 3SLS involves three steps. First, it uses all the 
exogenous variables to generate the predicted or instrumented values of endogenous variables. 
Second, it estimates a cross-equation covariance matrix of disturbances. Third, it re-estimates again 
the model with the covariance matrix used as a weighting matrix to obtain new values of the 
parameters. If the covariance matrix of disturbances is consistent, there is an advantage in using 3SLS 
instead of a 2SLS because it obtains more efficient estimators (Wooldridge 2002). As robustness 
check, we have tested the system of equations with various 2SLS models and we did not find 
differences in sign and significance for the variables of interest.
6
  
 
                                                 
6
 To run the 2SLS method, first we calculated the predicted value of the Probit function as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2002: 623).  
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RESULTS 
We report the results of our analyses in Table 3.  First, we explore the effect of market share on entry 
schedule in each new format size.  Beginning first with the control variables, we find evidence that 
the age of the firm has a significant influence on the entry schedule of the focal firm.  Following King 
and Tucci (2002), we also include a measure of the firm’s experience (Production and sales 
experience), and consistent with their results, we find evidence that firms with more experience in 
previous format sizes were more likely to enter emerging disk drive markets. 
 
*** Please insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
To test the first part of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we test whether a measure of the firm’s market share in 
existing disk drive formats influences their entry schedule.  Model 1 in Table 3 shows that, ceteris 
paribus, firms with greater Market share in the previous format size are more likely to schedule a later 
date for entry into a new disk drive market.  In support of Hypothesis 2 and in opposition to 
Hypothesis 1, we find statistical evidence that firms with greater market share are likely to schedule 
later entry dates.  We believe, however, that this finding should be interpreted cautiously because it 
may depend on the specified functional form of market share and production and sales experience.  
To capture the effect of sales on experience, King & Tucci (2002) draw on the learning curve 
literature to propose that a firm’s experience should follow a log discounted functional form of firm’s 
sales, and we followed this convention in creating production and sales experience.  Market share 
also derives from sales, and represents the firm’s sales compared to that of others in the previous year.  
Because they are both transformations of previous sales, the two variables are correlated, and if one 
variable is removed from the model, the coefficient of the other is always negative.  Thus, the 
strongest tendency appears to be that firms with greater sales are more likely to schedule earlier entry.  
We thereby interpret Model 1 to suggest that given a particular parameter form for previous 
experience, a firm with a larger market share will be more likely to schedule a later date.  This result 
is consistent with Hypothesis 2, but also suggests the need for further robustness testing.  As a first 
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step, we dichotomized Market share, and we found consistent results (though the model fit was 
reduced). 
 
To test the rest of Hypothesis 2 and our other hypotheses, we estimated two models of tardy entry.  
Model 2 represents an instrumental variable approach to solving the potential endogeneity of entry 
schedule.  Predicted scheduled entry is an estimation using the coefficients from Model 1.  Model 3 
ignores the endogeneity issue and uses scheduled entry.  As shown in both models, we find evidence 
that firms scheduling a late entry in the new format size are less likely to postpone their product 
introduction date.  In other words, firms that announce earlier than their competitors are more likely to 
be tardy, rescheduling their first shipment in the new market.  This provides some comfort that our 
―first order‖ development of our hypotheses may not be misplaced. 
 
We find support for the second part of Hypothesis 2.  Firms with larger market share are more likely 
to deliver their products on time.  This effect is above and beyond that provided by the later schedule 
that firms with high market share tend to choose. In other words, as suggested by H2, larger firms 
both tend to schedule a late entry, and they tend to be less likely to miss this scheduled date. 
 
Models 2 and 3 provide evidence to support Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  Consistent with our expectation 
that firms with positions in other markets or larger positions in disk drives would fear the loss of 
reputation entailed by late entry, we find strong evidence that firms operating in more sectors of 
existing technical markets (entry niches) and producing products in other markets (de alio) are less 
likely to postpone their release date.  We find no support for Hypothesis 4.  We find no evidence that 
norms of behavior (prior lateness) in the previous market entry influences future ―tardy behavior‖ in 
the industry.  
 
With respect to operational control variables, we find that uncertainty in technological development 
may push managers to miss scheduled entry dates.  Both technological position and jump have 
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positive and significant influence on tardy entry.  Thus, firms are more likely to be tardy in entering 
new markets if they currently employ more sophisticated technology or seek to do so in new markets. 
 
Turning finally to our performance model, we find strong evidence that firms with later scheduled 
entry and those firms that were tardy in entry can expect fewer sales in these markets.  Model 4 shows 
the result of a 3-stage least squares regression analysis. The 3SLS calculates what we are interested 
in: how two endogenous variables (tardy entry, scheduled entry) influence another endogenous 
variable (average future sales), in a system of three structural equations. The system includes three 
equations: the scheduled entry, the tardy entry and the performance equation. The model is calculated 
with the covariance matrix and with all the instrumented values in place of the endogenous variables.  
The results in Model 4 depict only one of the three equations: the performance equation (the one of 
interest).  This equation shows, as regressors, the two instrumented values of the endogenous 
variables (tardy entry, scheduled entry) and a control variable (experienced founders).  
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Findings 
In summary, we do not find support for the hypothesis that firms with a larger share of existing 
markets are more likely to schedule early entry into new markets to forestall competitors.  Nor do we 
find that they are more likely to be tardy.  On the contrary, we find support for our hypothesis (H2) 
that firms with a greater share of existing markets will tend to announce later entry and also to be on 
time.  We find evidence for Hypotheses 3a and 3b that the fear of lost reputation or other sanctions 
may deter tardy entry among incumbents with greater exposure in similar or diversified markets.  Yet, 
we find no evidence that the fear of such losses changed with the history of tardiness in the industry.  
We also form additional inferences from analysis of our control variables.  Firms that are closer to the 
technological frontier, or seek to make a bigger technological leap, are more likely to be tardy.  
Finally, we find that tardiness has a performance effect: firms that are tardy relative to their own 
announcement date tend to perform poorly in the market. 
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Implications and Extensions 
Existing research has considered extensively the determinants and effects of entry timing.  Our 
research suggests that researchers should also consider the degree to which observed entry is tardy or 
timely relative to a firm’s planned schedule.  Indeed, highlighting distinctions between scheduled and 
observed entry represents one of the contributions of this article.  Previous research has emphasized 
the degree to which firms actually ship products early or late relative to competitors.  We believe 
research should also consider the degree to which firms schedule early or late relative to competitors, 
and the degree to which they are timely or tardy manner relative to their own schedule.  In this paper, 
we are focusing on the early vs. late scheduled entry and timely vs. tardy entry relative to the 
scheduled entry. 
 
There are both empirical and theoretical reasons why greater precision with respect to planned and 
observed entry may be important.  Empirically, understanding this distinction may help resolve 
puzzles in the entry timing literature about whether early entry or late entry is beneficial.  Several 
theories predict that there are benefits to entering early (Klepper 1996; Lieberman and Montgomery 
1988).  Yet, empirical research provides inconsistent results on the effect of early vs. late entry, 
despite many controls for network externalities, industry, competition, etc.  We believe that some of 
these inconsistencies may be caused by measures that confound scheduled and actual shipment dates.  
In addition, our research suggests that models that only consider the scheduled entry date (which is 
the easiest measure to find and capture) may overlook a major moderator of the effect, which is 
timeliness relative to the firm’s own schedule.   
 
Our research also highlights the importance of reputational / relational assets in determining the actual 
entry schedule of the firm.  In many economic models of entry preemption or credible commitment to 
future competition, the underlying assumption is that the scheduled entry announcement deters other 
entry without any reputational feedback for either future credibility or technological competence.  In 
some sense, it is a two-period game in which by announcing an early schedule, the firm gains 
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reputation as a ―tough‖ player that scares off other firms in the next period.  However, we see from 
our results that reputation as a tough player cuts both ways.  If tardy entry is actually as bad for the 
firm as it appears, and customers take into consideration firm behavior in both related and upstream / 
downstream markets, then a rational decision might be to avoid the risk of possible penalties from 
tardy entry by foregoing the use of an entry announcement to forestall competitors. 
 
Avenues for additional research may also be suggested by conflicts between our results and the 
nascent literature on tardy entry.  For example, our results differ from those of Wu et al. (2004) with 
respect to potential fears of cannibalization.  Although they form a similar hypothesis to our own (H2) 
concerning the effect of the fear of cannibalization on tardy entry, they report evidence that the fear of 
cannibalization in the computer hardware, software, and telecommunications sector triggers entry 
tardiness.  In contrast to their empirical results, but consistent with the hypotheses of both articles, we 
find a strong effect in the opposite direction. The difference in the two findings may be due to our use 
of a model that also incorporates scheduled entry, while Wu et al. (2004) specify a simpler model that 
does not account for this complication.   
 
Our research supports the conclusion of Wu et al. (2004) that operational factors are important in 
determining entry timeliness or tardiness, and buttresses their call for greater research to clarify the 
precise mechanisms of this effect.  Results for our control variables are consistent with Wu et al. 
(2004), who proposed that uncertainty in product development can delay firms.  We find that the 
closer the firm is to the technological frontier, the more likely it is to be tardy.  But, this result raises 
additional questions.  Why for example, doesn’t the firm’s experience with such innovative 
technology have a corresponding benefit of speeding future entry timeliness?  One explanation may 
be that more sophisticated technological knowledge is harder to transfer to new development 
products.  We hope to explore this conjecture in future research. 
 
Finally, future research should go beyond an analysis of first-order effects and include more 
consideration of second-order or indirect effects.  As mentioned in the literature review, a full analysis 
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would consider the complicated reaction functions among managers, customers, and competitors.  
Although our research provides some evidence that first-order models can explain some observed 
behavior, we believe that a more formal equilibrium model should be the ultimate reference against 
which empirical analyses are compared.  
 
Limitations  
Our research has several limitations.  Two relate to the measurement of important variables used in 
our analysis.  First, as we discuss above, our results may depend on the particular parametric form 
chosen to measure experience and market share.  We use accepted and established parametric forms 
in creating our measures, but we believe that additional robustness tests are in order.  Second, our 
measure of tardy entry may be confounded with a firm’s preannouncement decision.  When a firm 
schedules an entry date, this is, by definition, an example of ―pre-announcing‖ (i.e., the product was 
not ready at the time the announcement was made).  Theory suggests that the date of the pre-
announcement as well as the date scheduled for shipment may both effect future performance.  In 
future work, we plan to capture both dates in our analysis.   
 
As mentioned in the literature review, our analysis makes it impossible to support both H1 and H2.  
Yet, both effects could be in force at the same time.  To allow for both effects, we could perform an 
analysis that includes temporal information about the entry announcements of other firms.  By 
evaluating the effect of such announcements, it should be possible to determine how a focal firm 
changes its strategy, and thereby tease out forestalling incentives from fears of cannibalization.   
 
The construction of our sample also limits our ability to draw general conclusions from our results.  
Because we need to include measures of existing characteristics, we must exclude from our analysis 
data on the first market entry of firms diversifying into the industry and the first product of startup 
firms.  We hope to be able to include these data in future analysis, though the measurement and 
econometric problems are daunting.   
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Finally, we plan to test the robustness of our findings to different parametric forms for our measure of 
tardiness.  In the current analysis, tardiness of entry is a dichotomous variable.  While this approach 
for entry timing is common in the literature, the actual continuous time calculation of tardiness might 
be preferable.  There are several econometric issues involved in using such a specification (e.g. right-
censoring of the data).  In appendix 1, we start to address these issues.  
 
In conclusion, we begin to fill the need for empirical and theoretical research on market entry 
timeliness.  While a large and flourishing literature considers entry timing and entry order, little 
attention has been given to whether this entry matches the firm’s planned schedule.  To begin to fill 
the need for theory, we draw on the strategic literature concerning entry forestalling, cannibalization, 
and the credible communication of unobservable characteristics.  We find evidence that some of these 
strategic considerations influence the propensity for firms to be timely or tardy.  We also find 
evidence that a firm’s technological position and aspirations influence entry tardiness.  Finally, we 
find evidence that both entry timing and the timeliness of this entry affect future sales performance.  
In total our research begins to address a gap in the literature, suggests how it might be filled, and 
clarifies how such research might extend understanding of how firms use both scheduled and actual 
entry timing to gain competitive advantage. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The right censoring of data  
 
In the discussion section, we consider a number of limitations of the current study.  One potential 
issue is that we parameterize tardiness as a dichotomous variable.  Clearly, a complete analysis of the 
robustness of our findings should include an analysis of the duration of the delay, not simply its 
existence.  Evaluating the duration of delay raises a statistical difficulty, because it forces us to 
consider the issue of right censoring and the meaning of ―failed‖ entry.  First, we will discuss the right 
censoring issue.   
 
Right censoring occurs when a firm schedules an entry in a new format size, but never ships a product 
during the period of the study.  Such failed entry may occur because the firm fails or is acquired 
before it can actually enter, or because time runs out on our panel.  In the above analysis, the cases 
were not included because their actual entry is never observed.  These cases also prevent us from 
using a regression analysis to estimate the duration of delay, because the delay is unobserved for these 
firms.  To allow the use of this censored data, we transform our cross-section dataset into a panel 
data-set and employ an accelerated failure-time analysis.  
 
The ―failure‖ variable is market entry that takes value 0 on the first month the firm scheduled an entry 
in a new market sector.  The variable is equal to 0 for every month of delay.  It turns 1 when the drive 
is actually shipped.  If the firm is timely in shipping the drive, the variable takes value 1 on the month 
the firm scheduled (and consequently shipped) the product, since the scheduled entry date and the 
shipment date coincide.  When firm scheduled their market entry, but never shipped the drive, the 
variable takes value 0 till the firm exits the industry or the end of the period study is reached.    
 
Accelerated failure-time regression Model 
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To test H1 and H2 and address the right censoring issue, we use the accelerated failure-time 
regression (AFT) model. The AFT model is suitable for right censoring data, because it allows 
estimation of the effect of censored observations.  The model is specified as: 
 
Log tij = Xij + zij  
 
Where the log tij is the natural logarithm of the scheduled-tardy entry time,  Xij is a vector of 
covariates of the firm i in the market j,   is a vector of regression coefficients, and zij is the error 
term, whose distribution form determines the regression model. The AFT assumes that the timing of 
the event is distributed according to a parametric baseline distribution (in this case the time length 
between the scheduled entry and the shipment date), which could have different shapes (Cleves et al. 
2004). A positive  accelerates the baseline distribution of the event time implying an increase in the 
expected waiting time for failure – the time length between the scheduled entry and the shipment 
entry increases.  A negative  means that the same time length tends to decrease, since the scheduled 
entry date and the shipment entry date tend to converge.  
 
Accelerated failure time requires the specification of a distribution, but how to select it?  The log 
likelihood-ratio, the Wald tests and the Akaike information criterion can be used to discriminate the 
appropriate parametric model (Cleves et al. 2004). In our case, the exponential distribution provides a 
better fitting model, and the Wald test suggests that it is the better distribution to use. 
 
Unfortunately, our failure time analysis raises another problem, because 8 firms fail to ever enter a 
new market – even after a delay of more than 10 years.  Surely, at some point during this time period, 
the firm stops being at risk to deliver the originally scheduled product.  Nor do the competitive forces 
and observer expectations that we evaluate in our analysis continue to be in effect.  That is, we don’t 
expect stakeholders to think: ―Firm X’s drive is 6 years late, maybe it will be released tomorrow.‖   
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In the models presented below, we do not limit the effect of these extended delays, but we tested to 
see if these firms might influence our results.  To do this, we created a maximum time window per 
format size for those firms that eventually shipped.  This value as set at 125%, 150%, 175% and 
200% of the longest observed delay.  Results from these specifications, do not differ in sign and 
significance from the results reported in model 2 and 3. 
*** Insert table 4 about here *** 
 
In Table 4, we display the new duration models (Model 1 to Model 3).  Model 1 uses the same sample 
as that used in Table 3 (i.e. it continues to use the censored sample) and confirms that our results from 
the cross section are not sensitive to the use of the binary variable for tardiness.  Model 2 and 3 
(correcting for and ignoring the endogeneity of the scheduled entry variable) illustrate the full sample, 
where observations of firms that never shipped in specific format are included.  We find consistent 
inference for variables of interest like market share, de alio and entry niches, which remain negative 
and significant as in the previous models.  Unlike the results reported earlier, however, coefficients 
for the predicted and the actual value of scheduled entry variable are no longer statistically significant, 
though they maintain their negative sign.   
 
Interestingly, across all of the duration models, we do not find significant effects of the operational 
variables on the time window.  The firm’s technological position or technical ambitions for the new 
product do not significantly predict the length of delay (though as reported earlier they do predict the 
existence of some delay).  In future research, we plan to investigate the source of these differences. 
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Figure 1: the theoretical framework  
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Table 1: Statistics 
  
Variable Description Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
              
Tardy entry Dummy=1 if firm is tardy in entering new market   109 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Scheduled entry 
Deviation of scheduled release date  
109 -0.13 0.84 
-
1.44 2.29 
future sales log average of future sales in the format size 109 2.23 2.52 0.05 8.60 
Market share  Market share in the previous format size (%) 109 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.50 
De alio Dummy=1 if  produces in related markets 109 0.69 0.47 0 1 
Niches 
Dummy=1 if the number of format and size categories in 
a given year >6 109 0.38 0.49 0 1 
prior lateness  
Firms that postponed their scheduled shipment in the 
previous market (%) 109 0.53 0.32 0 1 
Design 
experience 
Deviation of discounted number of prior capacity 
categories across all  drive sizes 109 1.53 1.36 
-
0.83 5.18 
Sales experience 
Deviation of discounted sales experience for each firm in 
the previous year 109 0.34 1.15 
-
0.98 3.59 
Technological 
position 
technological position in the previous format size 
109 0.59 0.39 0.02 1 
Jump 
Difference between the current technological position 
and the one in the previous format size  109 -0.17 0.44 
-
0.98 0.87 
Managerial 
experience 
Dummy =1 if management is industry expert  
109 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Age 
Deviation of time period in the industry in any format 
size 109 4.69 4.06 
-
1.30 16 
us Dummy=1 if US   109 0.54 0.50 0 1 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  variable                       
1 Market share 1           
2 De alio 
-
0.17 1          
3 Niches 0.10 0.15 1         
4 prior lateness  0.03 0.00 
-
0.03 1        
5 
Design 
experience 0.13 0.27 0.65 0.13 1       
6 Sales experience 0.52 
-
0.19 0.38 0.08 0.48 1      
7 
Technological 
position 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.38 0.32 0.10 1     
8 Jump 
-
0.06 
-
0.16 
-
0.07 
-
0.09 
-
0.05 
-
0.05 
-
0.63 1    
9 
Managerial 
experience 0.23 
-
0.76 
-
0.02 
-
0.05 
-
0.26 0.21 
-
0.12 0.19 1   
10 Age 0.02 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.50 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.01 1  
11 us 0.27 
-
0.38 0.03 
-
0.04 
-
0.11 0.32 0.13 
-
0.13 0.41 0.01 1 
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Table 3: the models (N=109 with 64 clusters) 
 
  
Entry schedule 
model 
Tardy Entry 
Model 
(correcting for 
endogeneity) 
Tardy Entry 
Model (ignoring 
endogeneity) 
Performance 
Model† 
(3SLS) 
Dependent 
variable 
Scheduled entry 
date Tardy entry Tardy entry 
Average future 
sales 
Independent 
variable 
1 2 3  4 (read down)  
Scheduled entry   -0.48**  
   (-2.39)  
Predicted 
scheduled entry  -0.92**  -1.81*** 
  (-2.18)  (-3.64) 
Predicted Tardy 
entry    -5.07*** 
    (-4.63) 
Market share 2.91*** -9.98** -8.10***  
 (5.35) (-2.54) (-2.89)  
de alio  -1.0*** -0.98***  
  (-3.17) (-3.09)  
Niches  -0.85** -0.87**  
  (-1.99) (-2.13)  
Prior lateness  0.31 0.27  
  (0.68) (0.58)  
Design 
experience  -0.01 -0.03  
  (-0.07) (-0.16)  
Production and 
sales experience -0.41***    
 (-5.59)    
Technological 
position 0.36* 1.45** 1.22**  
 (1.78) (2.38) (2.15)  
Jump  0.73** 0.66**  
  (2.22) (2.18)  
Experienced 
founders    2.39*** 
    (4.26) 
Age 0.08***    
 (3.34)    
US  -0.50 -0.27  
  (-1.55) (-0.82)  
Constant -0.72*** -0.02 0.07 4.02*** 
  (-4.33) (-0.04) (0.15) (8.04) 
Market dummies  No No No Yes 
F/ c2 10.53*** 33.35*** 37.57*** 59.65*** 
Likelihood-ratio   -50.28 -49.60   
†Only the performance equation is displayed here.    
p* < 0.10, p** < 0.05, p*** < 0.01, two-tailed tests, the t-statistics are in parentheses 
 
 
 
 Table 4. Duration models 
 
  
duration models♣  
correcting endogeneity 
duration models♣  
correcting endogeneity 
duration  models♣  
ignoring endogeneity 
Dependent variable Market entry Market entry Market entry 
Independent variable 
Restricted sample         
actual shipment only  Full sample   Full sample 
(read down)  1 2 3 
Scheduled entry   -0.17 
   (-0.91) 
Predicted scheduled entry -0.54** 0.20  
 (-2.28) (0.62)  
Predicted Tardy entry    
    
de alio -0.54** -0.67*** -0.67*** 
 (-2.38) (-2.71) (-2.60) 
Niches -1.11*** -1.21*** -1.21*** 
 (-3.68) (-4.19) (-4.03) 
Prior lateness 0.33 -0.11 -0.72 
 (0.81) (-0.02) (-0.14) 
Market share -2.78*** -3.38*** -3.36*** 
 (-4.87) (-3.72) (-4.02) 
Design experience 0.09 0.56 0.05 
 (0.82) (0.46) (0.39) 
Production and sales experience    
    
Technological position 0.55 0.78 0.08 
 (1.08) (0.15) (0.18) 
Jump 0.43 0.22 0.18 
 (1.25) (0.68) (0.57) 
Experienced founders    
    
Age    
    
US 0.08 0.27 0.32 
 (0.35) (1.08) (1.36) 
Constant 1.16*** 1.75*** 1.76*** 
  (3.16) (4.57) (4.56) 
Market dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
F/ c2 177.39*** 216.49*** 217.62*** 
Llikelihood-Ratio 284.52 253.81 254.21 
Observations 463 620 620 
Clusters 64 66 66 
No of subjects 109 117 117 
No. Of failures 109 109 109 
Time at risk 463 620 620 
†Only the performance equation is displayed here.   
♣Negative accelerated event-time coefficients in column 1, 2 and 3 indicates a shorter time lag between scheduled and shipment 
date 
p* < 0.10, p** < 0.05, p*** < 0.01, two-tailed tests, the t-statistics are in parentheses 
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